May, 2007

Why Classical Liberal “Liberty” Is Salient

by Daniel B. Klein

May 22nd, 2007

Classical liberal “liberty” is salient and cohesive because it has a hardy, tangible basis in ownership and consent. Yes, again, I know, there are holes and gray areas. But it is simple and plain to see that the minimum wage, drug prohibition, occupational licensing, etc., etc. initiate coercion and diminish this liberty. [...]

Read: Why Classical Liberal “Liberty” Is Salient

The Centrality of Liberty

by Edward Glaeser

May 22nd, 2007

There are two good reasons that liberty should be central in any discussion of public policy. First, freedom is the best candidate available to be the central goal of social policy. Second, any sensible policy discussion recognizes that emphasizing liberty provides a needed safeguard against the excesses of government power. While a philosophical [...]

Read: The Centrality of Liberty

Where’s the Nominalism?

by Liam Murphy

May 22nd, 2007

I doubt that Richard Epstein misunderstands the point I keep making, but he writes as if he does:
The proposition that each person is entitled to have the maximum liberty consistent with the like liberty of others is a position that only makes sense within the framework of the classical liberal system. The moment that [...]

Read: Where’s the Nominalism?

If We Must Have “Rights,” Don’t Forget the Subscripts

by Daniel B. Klein

May 22nd, 2007

If one says that the minimum wage is coercive, is one saying that the law violates the only true rights (e.g., freedom of contract)?
No.
But Liam continues to write as though someone in this exchange says “yes.”
If the law says employers may not pay less than $X, then, obviously, in one significant sense, employers [...]

Read: If We Must Have “Rights,” Don’t Forget the Subscripts

Classical Liberal “Liberty” and the Dangers of Indeterminacy

by Richard A. Epstein

May 21st, 2007

Liam once again raises the proposition that libertarians and classical liberals do not have any special claim to the use of the term “liberty,” but only can claim use of one peculiar sense of the term, which then has to do battle with others. I disagree with that position. The proposition that each [...]

Read: Classical Liberal “Liberty” and the Dangers of Indeterminacy

The Innocuous Indeterminacy of “Liberty”

by Liam Murphy

May 21st, 2007

My main point, that the concepts of coercion and liberty are indeterminate along politically significant fault-lines, seems innocuous enough; but it is not being received that way in this discussion. One wonders why this is, since this simple and hardly deep point is not in itself an objection to anyone’s political theory.
The [...]

Read: The Innocuous Indeterminacy of “Liberty”

Extra-Legal Institutions and Classical Liberal “Liberty”

by Daniel B. Klein

May 18th, 2007

Liam writes:
The obvious substantive issue in dispute between libertarians and the rest of us … is the little matter of whether there are pre-institutional property rights …
Is Liam trying to boil it all down to one dichotomy, namely, either: (1) the governmental legal rules that actually exist, or (2) nonsense-upon-stilts (Jeremy Bentham’s epithet for natural [...]

Read: Extra-Legal Institutions and Classical Liberal “Liberty”

What We Mean by “Liberty” — and “Wealth”

by Richard A. Epstein

May 18th, 2007

Let me just make a few comments to the various objections that Liam Murphy has raised to the definitions of “liberty” in use in classical liberal theory. I do not think that the term “liberty” has the deep philosophical ambiguity that he attributes to it. A person does not become more free because he has [...]

Read: What We Mean by “Liberty” — and “Wealth”

The Meanings of “Liberty”

by Liam Murphy

May 17th, 2007

I do agree with Daniel Klein that “semantics” is worth arguing about, but only in the sense that it’s good to know what people mean and it’s good to be on the lookout for conceptual sleights of hand.
There are at least three important notions of liberty (and it is liberty, I think, not [...]

Read: The Meanings of “Liberty”

Strategies of Cooperation

by Richard A. Epstein

May 17th, 2007

I am pleased that Daniel Klein has added yet further wrinkles to our discussion, on which I shall comment briefly on two.
First, there is much truth in Paul Rubin’s provocative suggestion that ordinary individuals evolved in group settings that were not entirely congenial to markets. The point of this observation is that families are [...]

Read: Strategies of Cooperation

Liberty and Semantics: Response to Murphy, Glaeser, and Epstein

by Daniel B. Klein

May 16th, 2007

I am grateful to Will Wilkinson, Brink Lindsey, and the Cato Institute for organizing this exchange on the semantics of liberty, or the distinction between voluntary and coercive action.
I think that, by and large, if our society were freer, we would have better housing, food, and healthcare.
But I feel sure that paramount in [...]

Read: Liberty and Semantics: Response to Murphy, Glaeser, and Epstein

Voluntary and Coercive Action: A Key Distinction in the Overall System of Liberty

by Richard A. Epstein

May 14th, 2007

In his reply, University of Chicago law and economics guru Richard A. Epstein attempts to lay out an account of “justified coercion.” Taking the minimum wage as an example, Epstein sets forth and then rejects several grounds on which the minimum wage may be seen as non-coercive. He then sets forth and rejects several arguments that might justify the coercion in economic regulations such as the minimum wage. According to Espstein, state coercion in support of market institutions “is justified because it expands the envelope for gains from trade through voluntary exchange.” In general, coercion may be justified when “it is to the long-term advantage of all,” but detailed and systematic analysis of particular institutions — such as the one Epstein provides for the minimum wage — is required to establish when this is, and is not, the case.

Read: Voluntary and Coercive Action: A Key Distinction in the Overall System of Liberty

Coercive Regulation and the Balance of Freedom

by Edward Glaeser

May 11th, 2007

Harvard economist Edward Glaeser agrees with Dan Klein that economic regulations, such as minimum wage laws, are coercive, and that this ought to give us pause. “For millenia, governments have abused their control over the tools of violence,” Glaeser writes. “The historical track record insists that we treat any governmental intervention warily.” However, that does not rule out coercion. “The ultimate job of the state is to increase the range of options available to its citizens,” Glaeser maintains, and well-targeted coercion can increase total freedom in this sense. “Certainly, redistribution reduces the freedom of the taxpayer but it increases the options of the recipient of governmental largesse,” Glaeser says. He goes on to argue that laws that restrict the liberty to contract, such as the minimum wage, generally are not freedom-enhancing overall and tempt government abuse.

Read: Coercive Regulation and the Balance of Freedom

Best of the Blogs: Richard Chappell on Property and Coercion

Daniel Klein’s lead essay has sparked a great deal of discussion on blogs far and wide. Here at Cato Unbound, we bring the best of the blogs inside the conversation. We start this month with a lucid post by the young philosopher Richard Chappell at Philosophy, et cetera. Richard writes, “While I have some sympathy for his general project, Klein’s essay risks reinforcing three conceptual errors of libertarian ideology.” And they are…

Read: Best of the Blogs: Richard Chappell on Property and Coercion

Coercion as a Political Concept

by Liam Murphy

May 8th, 2007

NYU philosopher and legal theorist Liam Murphy responds to Daniel Klein’s lead essay by questioning the relevance of the general concept of coercion to the defense of market institutions and disputing Klein’s particular characterization of coercion. Murphy observes that arguments in defense of markets generally appeal to pre-institutional rights or a conception of good consequences. In neither case does the idea of coercion play a key role. Further, Murphy suggests that Klein’s particular account of coercion is loaded with contestable moral baggage. But, Murphy writes, “The concept of coercion … is deeply indeterminate, with disagreement about correct usage tracking exactly the fault lines that have political significance; so there is simply no right answer to such questions as whether a labor contract for below a minimum wage, or its prohibition, is coercive.”

Read: Coercion as a Political Concept

Economics and the Distinction between Voluntary and Coercive Action

by Daniel B. Klein

May 7th, 2007

George Mason University’s Daniel Klein begins this month’s lead essay by presenting evidence from a poll of economists showing that more than half of those who are in favor of a minimum wage generally don’t think it is coercive, suggesting that judgments about what is coercive or voluntary underpin professional opinion about economic policy. If so, Klein asks, shouldn’t economists address the question of coercion more directly? Klein argues that we should treat non-coercion as a maxim to be followed “ninety-something percent of the time,” which allows for the legitimacy of coercion under certain conditions. Economists may then ask: “When should we endorse the liberty maxim and when not?” in a principled way. Klein draws on ideas from F.A. Hayek and Adam Smith to argue for the centrality of the distinction between voluntary and coercive action in the ordinary practice of economic inquiry, and to urge a renewed emphasis on the role of liberty in economic theory.

Read: Economics and the Distinction between Voluntary and Coercive Action