Why Classical Liberal “Liberty” Is Salient

Classical liberal “liberty” is salient and cohesive because it has a hardy, tangible basis in ownership and consent. Yes, again, I know, there are holes and gray areas. But it is simple and plain to see that the minimum wage, drug prohibition, occupational licensing, etc., etc. initiate coercion and diminish this liberty. I take it that Liam agrees here.

So-called positive liberty is anything but salient and cohesive. For one thing, it needs to be defined in terms of eventual overall consequences, weighing gains for some against losses for others (including folks beyond the border?). We scarcely agree on the consequences of, say, the minimum wage. Thousands can and should agree that the minimum wage law initiates coercion against employers, but they necessarily will disagree widely about the consequences of the policy.

So speaking of the minimum wage or just about any far-reaching policy as a gain in positive liberty is dissonant and muddled from the get-go. “Positive liberty” necessarily functions as a vague, emotive slogan, not a meaningful distinction.

As noted previously, if “positive liberty” means something like greater choice or wealth, then catching the flu is a diminution of positive liberty.

Traditionally, liberty has meant the absence of coercion. If catching the flu is a diminution of liberty, where is the coercion? Coercion implies a coercer. Who is the coercer?

If I slip in the bathtub and break my leg, I lose “positive liberty.” But who is the coercer?

If “positive liberty” means wealth, better choices, or well-being, why don’t we use those terms, like normal people? (In his latest, Ed mostly comes around on this matter.)

For such reasons, “positive liberty” is not enlightened semantics. It is useful, really, toward one end alone (an end I deem unenlightened): Diluting and confusing the classical-liberal meaning of liberty. “Positive liberty” is effective as a subversion of the focalness and general comprehension of the idea of classical-liberal liberty.

So if Liam is saying that the semantics of “liberty” are indeterminate, I say that it need not be and should not be. C’mon, Liam, let’s mean classical-liberal liberty when we say “liberty.” The semantic rivals to classical-liberal liberty are lame. As Richard said, only classical-liberal liberty is really worthy of the name.

Liam writes: “Exactly what method of conceptual analysis do [Epstein and Klein] propose?” If he means to declare that classical-liberal judgment of the desirable is indeterminate, then he is reiterating what I started off saying. As Smith put it, the rules of aesthetics are aspirational. They are not like grammar, but rather are “loose, vague, and indeterminate.”

That is no embarrassment. I’m sure that any complex of sensibilities that Liam might articulate for deciding the desirable would be no less loose, vague, and indeterminate. It is unfair to impose a double standard, maintaining that classical-liberal sensibilities about the desirable must look like a grammar while everyone else’s are allowed to be loose, vague, and indeterminate. On that score, we are all in the same boat of indeterminacy. But that does not deny that the voluntary/coercive distinction is rather more like a grammar, and might serve as a strong presumption in our culture and governance. Being classically liberal is believing that we should make it so.

One Response to “Why Classical Liberal “Liberty” Is Salient”

1. Economic Investigations says:
   May 25th, 2007 at 1:20 pm

   News of the World #36

   Another late edition… Austro-Athenian Empire Immigration, Secession, and Taxation, Roderick T. Long on arguments against secession. The Bayesian Heresy Econ Podcasts, what the title says. Politics of Pension Reform in India. Some people get hard …

This entry was posted on Tuesday, May 22nd, 2007 at 4:33 pm and is filed under Uncategorized. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Responses are currently closed, but you can trackback from your own site.