Multiple Thefts, Multiple Tariffs
by Christopher Wellman
The Conversation
May 27th, 2008
I agree with John Ghazvinian’s claim that Teodoro Obiang deserves to be punished for his tyrannical rule over the citizens of Equatorial Guinea. Indeed, given that these citizens are obviously in no position to do so themselves, Obiang strikes me as an ideal candidate for international criminal prosecution and punishment. But one can concede all of this without denying Wenar’s core point that Obiang has no valid title to the country’s oil deposits, and thus one should not buy oil from him. It seems to me that the very same reasoning that the American government has invoked to prohibit American companies from buying oil from the regime in Khartoum applies to Obiang. As a consequence, we ought not to be buying stolen oil from Obiang, and (as Ghazvinian points out) the Russians would be justified in putting tariffs on our exports as long as we do. Thus, like Ghazvinian, I suspect that the logic of Wenar’s reasoning might well lead to a proliferation of tariffs. But it is not clear to me that this constitutes a reductio of Wenar’s position. If there are multiple countries buying stolen resources from illegitimate rulers, then why not have multiple tariffs designed to repay the various victims of the initial thefts?