March, 2010

Palmer on Republicanism

by Philip Pettit
The Conversation
March 30th, 2010

Let me be somewhat narcissistic and respond to Tom Palmer’s comments on my own position, without giving attention to the many other interesting points raised in this discussion.
Palmer chides me for ignoring the possibility of liberal republicanism, which he associates with Joyce Appleby’s historical study. I am not exactly sure what he has in mind [...]

Read: Palmer on Republicanism

Liberal Republicanism, Moving Pictures, and Why Freedom Isn’t the Same as Goodness

by Tom G. Palmer
The Conversation
March 27th, 2010

I encourage anyone, including the other discussants on this topic, who has not yet read A Brief History of Liberty to do so.  It’s an admirable book and full of interesting insights.  (Like all the books I find interesting, I also was not persuaded by all of it, but each chapter was stimulating and — [...]

Read: Liberal Republicanism, Moving Pictures, and Why Freedom Isn’t the Same as Goodness

Is Liberty an Inherently Social Concept?

by Jason Brennan
The Conversation
March 24th, 2010

Palmer says that no matter what happens to a man on a desert island, the man is neither free nor unfree, because liberty is an inherently social concept. Palmer might want to limit his talk of ‘liberty’ this way. Ordinary people do not, and they are not obviously mistaken in having a range [...]

Read: Is Liberty an Inherently Social Concept?

Reflections on the History and Language of Liberty

by David Schmidtz and Jason Brennan
The Conversation
March 23rd, 2010

We want to thank the Cato Institute in general and Will Wilkinson in particular for hosting this forum.  We are honored to be part of it.
This forum began with a synopsis of the introduction to our Brief History of Liberty, published last month by Blackwell.  That book was a departure for both of us.  We [...]

Read: Reflections on the History and Language of Liberty

Out of the Armchair, into Indeterminacy

by John Christman
Reaction Essay
March 17th, 2010

Penn State philosopher John Christman agrees with Schmidtz and Brennan’s claim that disputes over the nature of liberty cannot be settled by conceptual analysis alone, and he applauds their call for historical and empirical work to reveal the likely results of government’s attempts to promote this or that kind of liberty. But Christman warns that “in order to formulate this research project coherently, we will not be able to escape the armchair,” and raises two challenging questions for Schmidtz and Brennan’s approach. First, he asks “how can a determination be made whether a government policy succeeds in increasing liberty without a prior and independent evaluation of the justification of that policy? Second, … why and how is the focus to be solely on the actions of the ‘government’ rather than, say, on other powerful social actors such as economic firms and corporate agents,” which government policy helps define? Christman concludes by suggesting that investigation beyond the armchair will reveal the track record of competitive markets in “in effectively improving the lives of citizens in an equitable and morally acceptable manner” to be one of “obvious and dismal failure.”

Read: Out of the Armchair, into Indeterminacy

On the Promotion of Liberty

by Philip Pettit
Reaction Essay
March 15th, 2010

Princeton philosopher Philip Pettit agrees with Schmidtz and Brennan that “policy-making and institution-building … ought to be informed by empirical research and modeling.” However, Pettit “cannot see why they think this undermines philosophical argument about the merits of adopting one or another conception of freedom as a primary concern of government.” Empirical research can tell us what is feasible, Pettit points out, but it cannot tell us what is desirable. Public political deliberation, Pettit urges, requires a “basis of evaluation that will make sense” to our fellow citizens. A proliferation of different considerations applying in different kinds of cases cuts against “the formation of a society as a community of deliberation,” which Pettit argues depends on their being values of universal concern. Pettit goes on to defend his conception of freedom as “non-domination,” which is “the sort of freedom you enjoy when you are not subject to the will of another agent or agency,” which he contrasts from freedom from interference.

Read: On the Promotion of Liberty

Liberty Is Liberty

by Tom G. Palmer
Reaction Essay
March 12th, 2010

In his bracing retort to the lead essay, Cato Senior Fellow Tom G. Palmer says he finds Schmidtz and Brennan’s discussion of liberty “provocative, but not enlightening.” Palmer contends that they misconstrue Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction between positive and negative liberty, and that to use ‘freedom’ or ‘liberty’ as synonyms for ‘wealth’ or ‘ability’ “generates confusion, rather than clarity.” Freedom, Palmer argues, “is an inherently social concept,” but the having of assets or abilities is not. Wealth is valuable, Palmer says, “but the interesting issue is how wealth is related to liberty, not as species to genus, but as effect to cause.” According to Palmer, Schmidtz and Brennan’s endorsement of a notion of positive liberty “confuses … the relationship between government and freedom” and invites “[t]he elimination of liberalism as a coherent intellectual and political force.”

Read: Liberty Is Liberty

Conceptions of Freedom

by David Schmidtz and Jason Brennan
Lead Essay
March 10th, 2010

In this month’s lead essay, David Schmidtz and Jason Brennan, drawing on their new book A Brief History of Liberty, expose an alleged myth about liberty: that “negative liberty” is the special concern of classical liberals and libertarians, while “positive liberty” is the special concern of Marxists, socialists, and modern liberals. “The myth is perpetuated,” they argue, “because both sides to this debate make a common assumption: Liberty — whatever that is — is to be promoted by government in a direct way.” Schmidtz and Brennan challenge this assumption, arguing that whether or not government ought to promote liberty of any stripe depends on evidence about how well suited government is to the job. Arguing that disputes over the role of government cannot be settled by an analysis of the meaning of the concept of liberty, Schmidtz and Brennan maintain that “both negative and positive liberty matter. Negative liberty matters in part because it is a highly effective, if imperfect, way of promoting positive liberty.”

Read: Conceptions of Freedom