Understanding the Strategic Model — The Dominant Post-9/11 Paradigm on Terrorism
by Max Abrahms
The Conversation
March 1st, 2010
Terrorism research focuses on three main questions. First, what are the consequences of terrorism? Second, what are the causes of terrorism? And third, what is the optimal government response to terrorism? These key questions are inherently interconnected because it is generally accepted that the outcome of terrorism reveals its appeal, which counterterrorism measures ought to divest in order to minimize the incentive for this violent behavior.
Within both the academic and policy communities, the dominant post-9/11 paradigm is what I call the Strategic Model. This model posits that (1) terrorism is an effective tactic for coercing government concessions; (2) rational groups are therefore using this tactic to achieve their policy demands; and (3) the international community can thus combat terrorism by providing superior avenues for achieving them via peace processes or democracy promotion. Clearly, the conventional wisdom is predicated on its first premise — that terrorism is indeed an effective tactic for groups to achieve their stated political preferences, be it the withdrawal of foreign troops, the creation of a new homeland, or the establishment of a different national ideology.
But what if it turns out that terrorism is actually among the worst tactics in the world for inducing large or small political concessions? What if instead of helping to accomplish them, substate attacks on civilians steel their governments from giving in to the perpetrators’ policy demands? The emerging evidence that terrorism is a suboptimal tactic for achieving them suggests that its perpetrators are motivated by alternative incentive structures, with important implications for counterterrorism strategy.
There is thus nothing wrong with the basic logic of the Strategic Model. But only by examining the real-world consequences of terrorism can we hope to understand its true appeal and how best to combat it. I therefore agree with Paul Pillar that notwithstanding the conventional wisdom particularly within the field of political science, the behavior of terrorist groups suggests that their goals may have nothing to do with coercing government compliance. Otherwise, those who participate in terrorism would be acting deeply irrationally.
