Should we learn to stop worrying and love the drone? Not exactly. It is important to distinguish between drones as weapons systems and their use for surveillance. The latter purpose could be more justifiable, especially in defense of human rights, but serious questions arise. By what authority would governments or nongovernmental groups have the right to conduct surveillance over the territory of a sovereign state? Sniderman and Harris acknowledge that sending drones to spy on Syria would violate national and international laws. What limitations should be placed on such surveillance? Would those being spied upon have the right to fire upon the drones, perhaps prompting retaliation and leading to a drone-against-drone scenario of robotic war? Would images of wrongdoing provided by drones be admissible in legal proceedings? Should they be used by broadcast media?

These and many other questions about the use of drones demand urgent attention and clarification. As Tom Barry and I have argued, the role of drones should be debated nationally and internationally, and legally binding guidelines and protocols for their use need to be established and enforced.

Killing the mafia dons who control these violent networks may cause some temporary disruption, but it will not end the threats of violence and could make matters worse. U.S. military attacks—of all kinds, including ground operations, conventional bombing and drone strikes—may arouse popular resentment and hatred toward American policy and increase the terrorist recruitment rate. Donald Rumsfeld asked the right question years ago, “Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrasas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?” In Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia the answer is clearly no. After years of war in Afghanistan and hundreds of drone strikes into Pakistan, the Taliban insurgency is stronger than ever. Why do we think more of the same will produce a different result?

I have argued, as have many others, that the availability of drone weapons may increase the temptation to use force. This assertion, Goure claims, lacks logic. He seems to be suggesting that concerns about casualties play no role in decisions about military intervention. In democratic societies, however, military casualty levels are a major issue. Some operations have been called off because of military casualties, for example after the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and the "Black Hawk down" disaster a decade later in Somalia. Because of the political sensitivity of military casualties, government officials often try to lower or hide the human costs of war. Drones change these dynamics. The ability to launch military strikes without the risk of American casualties removes one of the principal political burdens associated with the decision to use force. How much influence this may have in shaping particular decisions is certainly debatable, but to suggest that it has no influence is, well, illogical.

Goure’s quote from Joshua Goldstein is misleading. He is correct in observing that without the use of drone strikes, the only option for precise military strikes in Pakistan would be ground invasion. As Goldstein notes, these would be much bloodier and far more dangerous operations. They would carry a high risk of failure. Goure does not take the argument to its logical conclusion. If drones did not exist, and if invasion were the only option, would the United States really launch major ground operations against Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Pakistan? Highly unlikely. Without drones there would be no campaign of military strikes against Pakistan, and probably none in Somalia either. And that’s the point. These weapons allow the use of military force in settings where otherwise it would not be an option.

Goure ignores Goldstein’s main argument. The use of force has indeed become less frequent in recent decades, but the reasons for this important historic development have nothing to do with precision weaponry. Goldstein emphasizes the importance of international peacekeeping missions as a decisive factor in creating stronger mechanisms of global governance. He and Steven Pinker also emphasize the influence of the global spread of democracy, heightened economic interdependence, the rise of international organizations, increasing levels of education, and the empowerment of women. Goldstein and Pinker also note an emerging global norm against violence and war. In many parts of the world people increasingly recognize that security depends less on high tech weaponry than on creating social and economic conditions for human flourishing, so that people can settle their differences through peaceful means rather than the use of force.

This is not about utopia or the second coming. Conflicts are inevitable, and armed violence will probably always be with us, but we can learn to settle differences in more peaceful ways. Placing our faith in weapons technology will not make us more secure or eliminate the underlying social and economic conditions that breed violent extremism in places that lack democracy, development and governance.