Let me be the first to welcome Dean Chemerinsky to the fray. Perhaps he will draw some fire while I reload (so to speak).
Bob Levy thinks a gun lobby strategy of using the “slippery slope” argument to keep gun owners in a perpetual state of anxiety about gun confiscation would be “bizarre and ineffective,” while David Kopel (a frequent contributor to the NRA’s First Freedom magazine) does his bizarre best to reflect that strategy by now claiming that the Brady Campaign is a fellow-traveler with those who want “a global ban on gun ownership for self-defense.” I agree with Bob’s characterization of the strategy, particularly after Heller, but as Kopel’s postings show, it is what it is.
Neither of these writers has yet provided a reason to doubt my thesis that Heller is a paradox. By giving gun control opponents the Supreme Court interpretation of the Second Amendment they wanted, the ruling may have made it easier to pass reasonable gun restrictions. The paradox for gun control advocates like me is that the likely favorable effects of Heller on the gun control debate result from a ruling that is constitutionally indefensible. At the risk of stepping back into the “old debate,” I return to the Heller majority opinion and to the argument that since the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment was “preexisting,” it can’t exclusively relate to the militia.
The argument is wrong if there exist examples, predating the Second Amendment, expressing a right of the people to be armed that relate entirely to military affairs and not to private self-defense. One such example is the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, but Kopel, and the Heller majority claim that its “right to keep and bear arms” provision guaranteed a right to gun ownership for “defense of hearth and home.” Let me quote the entire provision, Article 17 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights:
The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence. And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.
Of course, the entire context in which the people’s “right to keep and to bear arms” appears in this provision demonstrates that the right refers only to service in the militia. That the Heller majority would claim that this provision concerns private self-defense is proof of my original point, i.e. that the Court reached its predetermined conclusion only by ripping key phrases out of context.
The Heller Court’s assertion (echoed by Kopel), that the Massachusetts courts read this provision as relating to private self-defense, is a transparent distortion of the case law. The controlling precedent here is Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847 (1976), in which the Supreme Judicial Court predictably held that Article 17 (the text of which has never changed since 1789) is directed at “service in a broadly based, organized militia,” not “to guaranteeing individual ownership or possession of weapons.” In the upside-down world of the pro-gun constitutional theorist, however, this holding, the most recent ruling of the highest court in the jurisdiction on the issue, is less controlling than rulings of a century before. Thus, the Heller majority and Kopel cite cases from 1825 and 1896 which, it turns out, suggest only that the Article 17 right does not protect those who may abuse firearms and that the legislature has the police power to ban public drilling with guns as a private military organization.
Recall that Kopel’s original argument was that because the right to keep and bear arms was “preexisting” it could not be exclusively militia-related, because there was no such preexisting right. The Massachusetts provision alone defeats Kopel’s argument.